Abstract: Many scholars have argued that primary elections are an important factor in the polarization of the American Congress. Yet little research measures change in the policy preferences of primary electorates to evaluate the connection directly. We create the first explicit measures of the preferences of primary voters over the last 60 years using a Bayesian item-response theory model. Although the overall distribution of population preferences has changed little, the preferences of primary voters are now much more related to the party of the primary that they attend. We show that liberals are much more likely to turn out in Democratic primaries and conservatives are much more likely to turn out in Republican primaries. We estimate that the divergence of primary from general electorates is six times larger in 2012 than in 1958 owing to this "primary sorting". This trend began with the emergence of the Southern Republicans. As the Republican party became viable, conservative Southerners switched to Republican primaries leading to a leftward shift in Democratic primary electorates. Nationwide, primary sorting began sometime after it began in the South. We speculate that Southern Realignment played a clarifying role that contributed to subsequent sorting of primary electorates nationwide.
Introduction
The polarization of the United States Congress since the 1970s is one of the most important phenomena in American politics. Although there are many explanations for that empirical observation, one puzzling aspect of it is that congressional polarization has occurred despite little increase in polarization of the public Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope (See e.g., 2005 (See e.g., 2006 ); Thomsen (See e.g., 2014) . One prominent strand of this literature embedded in the tradition of the electoral connection suggests that primary elections may be implicated in polarization. Jacobson (2012) argues that polarization partially stems from polarized primary electorates nominating more polarized candidates for office.
However, evidence to date on changes in the polarization of primary electorates is limited to recent years (e.g., Jacobson, 2012; McKee and Hayes, 2009) or longer time-series of evidence without direct measures of voter preferences (Brady, Han, and Pope, 2007) . We do not know if and how much primary voters have polarized from the 1950s and 1960s era of heterogeneous congressional parties to the present era of more homogeneous parties.
Despite an extensive scholarly literature debating the importance of primary elections, this is the first paper to our knowledge to directly measure the preferences of primary electorates over a long span of time. 1 We show that large changes have occurred in the policy preferences of the Americans who vote in Democratic and Republican primaries over the past 60 years. Our evidence 1 McKee and Hayes (2009) considers primary elections from 1988 to 2008, finding that the electorate has polarized in the South in terms of self-identified liberalism and conservatism, as well as race. Our time series begins in 1958 and we measure preferences using responses to questions about policy.
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shows that what we call party sorting led to more polarized primary electorates. 2 We find that this change began with the Southern Realignment, which drew the most conservative voters into newly relevant Southern Republican primaries and left behind a less conservative Southern Democratic primary electorate. We find that participants in Southern Republican primaries were conservative from the beginning of that party's viability around 1964. This link between the Southern Realignment and the polarization of primaries helps explain the timing of this change. We speculate that the change in primary electorates in the South contributed to a change in perceptions of the parties, thereby kicking off further polarization of primary electorates in both the South and the North.
The timing of the polarization of primary electorates in the North and South is consistent with this account, although our evidence admittedly is circumstantial.
We show that the set of voters who turn out in primary elections has polarized from 1958 to 2012. This finding provides an electoral mechanism translating party sorting into centrifugal pressure on representatives. The polarization of primary electorates is explained more by primary sorting than by changes in what kinds of citizens choose to participate in nominating contests at all. In particular, liberals are now much more likely to participate in Democratic primaries and conservatives are more likely to participate in Republican primaries rather than attending the primary of the other party. This is consistent with recent research showing that primaries with more open rules of participation do not have more moderate primary electorates (Hill, 2015; Norrander and Wendland, 2016; Sides et al., 2014) . Instead, party sorting shapes the parties, and changes in primary electorates reflect changes in the composition of the parties regardless of what institutional barriers to participation are relaxed or put in place.
We also find that this trend of sorting into more distinct party primaries appears to have begun in the mid-20th century American South, when the Democratic primary electorate shifted to the left as conservatives became Republicans in greater numbers. This was then followed by broad polarization in primaries across the country. While non-Southern primaries were modestly sorted from the beginning of our time series, it is only after the decade-long leftward shift of the Democratic primary in the South that sorting in non-Southern primaries began. In the 1960s, Southern
Democrats were as conservative as Northern Republicans. By 1980, Southern Democrats had moved substantially to the left as the Southern Republican party grew. Polarization in the nonSouth proceeded after Southern Democrats led the way.
Although many others have written about the realignment of American Southern politics, and some have noted the temporal connection to polarization, the electoral relationships between these phenomena deserves more attention. In fact, one prominent discussion of polarization (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2006, p. 49-51) argues that the Southern realignment cannot account for polarization because congressional polarization is both a Northern and Southern phenomenon.
While it is widely appreciated that the Southern Realignment led to a new Republican coalition in the South, it is less clear why this happened when it did, and what role voters played in shaping the new coalition. In addition, many possible coalitions could have formed at this time, and it is not clear why economic conservatism became a feature of Southern Republicanism. For instance, racial conservatives could well have joined with economic moderates, incorporating the existing "conservative coalition" into the Republican Party. Our account can explain why and how Southern
Republicans became the party of white economic and racial conservatives.
Our evidence comes from a time-series of comprehensive estimates of American voter ideology using the American National Election Studies (ANES, American National Election Studies, 2014).
We draw on estimates of citizen ideology from Hill and Tausanovitch (2015) . Although Hill and Tausanovitch (2015) find little polarization in the American population as a whole, we use these same estimates to show that the primary electorates have polarized. This provides the longest time-series of individual primary voter preferences to date. Voters with extreme views are more likely to participate in primaries today, and primaries today are more ideologically homogenous than in the past. This realignmentis directly related to the larger trend of "party sorting" (Fiorina and Abrams, 2012; Levendusky, 2009b) . We note at the outset that we do not attempt to measure the causal effect of primary electorate preferences on legislative behavior, although we provide 4 circumstantial evidence of such a link. In our account, legislative polarization and the sorting of primary electorates cause each other, making empirical examination of this link challenging.
In sum, we add to existing indirect and anecdotal accounts of changing preferences of primary voters over the last half century with direct evidence of polarization in that group over the period from 1958 to 2012. This polarization corresponds to a time of dramatic changes in party behavior in Congress. Regional patterns are consistent with the role of the Southern realignment in clarifying party positions and leading to two viable parties in the South. Our results suggest that polarized primary elections may have been an important input into the polarization of Congress, and that research should continue on this potential relationship. The findings show that changes in turnout patterns in primary elections may be of secondary importance to the sorting of citizens into more homogeneous party primaries.
Argument
The battle over civil rights in the 1960s transformed the American South from a one-party to a twoparty system. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson placed the Democratic Party firmly on the side of the civil rights movement and against segregation, culminating in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. This prompted segregationist Senator Strom Thurmond to switch from Democrat to Republican, and coincided with Republican Barry Goldwater's presidential bid in 1964 on a platform that opposed federal intervention in civil rights. Carmines and Stimson (1989) argue that the 1964 presidential election, in particular, was central to the transformation of party politics. Schickler (2016) argues that this transformation was driven by long-brewing changes in the electorate rather than sudden changes among elites. Nonetheless, the important point for our argument is that the reputations of the parties did not change until the 1960s. were for the most part across-the-board conservatives. We speculate that economic conservative were the first to jump the Democratic ship because of already-shared preferences with the economically more conservative non-Southern Republican Party. These shared preferences smoothed the path for Southern whites who had a long-standing allegiance to the Democratic Party, but disliked its turnaround on civil rights. Carmines and Stimson (1989, p. 190) allude to this possibility in suggesting that racial conservatism was an adaptation of "generalized conservatism" and not an adaptation of racism or segregation. V.O. Key (1949, p. 385) wrote, "On nonrace matters, southern spokesmen on the national scene, popular impression to the contrary notwithstanding, often disagree among themselves. These differences are often traceable to the fact that the party contains within itself groups of citizens who would, under other circumstances, be divided among two parties." This division into two parties is exactly what occurred. The first Southern participants in Republican primaries were those who were both racially conservative and economically conservative, establishing that grouping of policy preferences for subsequent Republican nominating contests.
Of course, a key part of this story is also the enfranchisement of a new voting population in the South during the 1960s: Southern blacks. These new voters are generally thought to have been more liberal and may have participated in increasingly liberal Democratic primaries in the South (e.g., Hood, Kidd, and Morris, 2001) . That enfranchisement was a crucial part of the partisan realignment (e.g., Black, 1978; Black and Black, 2009; Shafer and Johnston, 2009; Polsby, 2005) .
In this essay we do not address the new black electorate not because we discount its importance -we believe it to be of central importance -but because our data source is a geographic cluster sample with limited coverage of blacks in the South. All of our argument about polarizing primary electorates in the South signaling a new party brand to non-Southern primary voters applies equally to African-Americans, but we want to be cautious to keep within the data we have.
As Southern white conservatives moved to the Republican Party for both primary and general elections, those who continued to participate in Democratic primaries were the former participants who were least opposed to the economic policies of the national Democratic Party. In part owing to the direct effect of more liberal primary electorates and party identifiers, and 3 This is consistent with Erikson, Wright, and McIver (1993, p. 17-20) , who find little correlation between ideology and partisanship across states, averaging over the 1976-1988 period. 4 We assume that primary voters are at least partially expressive in their behavior. Fully strategic primary voters might have nominated the best candidate for the general election, even if they had more extreme preferences (e.g., Aranson and Ordeshook, 1972; Coleman, 1971) . We also note that causality might have operated in the opposite direction, from Congress to the composition of primary electorates.
in part owing to the indirect effect of more liberal politicians, we hypothesize that primary election polarization solidified the moderate-to-liberal reputation of the Democratic Party. That would have clarified that the Republican Party was a better fit for conservative voters and that the Democratic party was a better fit for liberals (consistent with the argument in Levendusky, 2009a) , both inside and out of the South. Primary sorting nationwide reinforced the more liberal shift in the Democratic Party that was initiated by the Southern realignment, and allowed Republicans to begin a slow migration to the right. 5 As conservatives became Republicans and liberals became Democrats, in both the South and the non-South, primary electorates across the country became more polarized.
Note that this argument could help explain how primary polarization could be an important component of congressional polarization, whileat the same time empirical studies find little influence of the incidence (e.g., Hirano et al., 2010) Republican primary elections serving to change the brands of the parties in the South.
In the remainder of the essay, we show that the patterns we have just described are borne out when we look to over-time measures of the policy preferences of primary voters. In particular, primary electorates polarize over time, and this polarization appears to be explained more by sorting of ideology to party primary than by changes in participation. The Southern Democratic primary shifted to the left prior to the broader divergence of the two parties that occurred in both the South and the non-South.
Design
A direct measure of polarization amongst the voting public requires estimates of the views of individual voters. The public opinion survey provides an opportunity to gather such estimates, but we need to choose which public opinion questions to consider and how to summarize them.
These choices are complicated further by the fact that very few public opinion polls ask the same questions over long stretches of time, making time-series comparisons of views challenging.
The method of Hill and Tausanovitch (2015) 
where y ij is the response of respondent i to question j, β jk and α jk are the discrimination and difficulty parameters for response option k to item j, and x i is respondent i's unobserved policy ideology. This model assumes that policy responses are structured by a latent ideological dimen-9 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 This design is a test of the implications of a larger argument. In short, we hypothesize that more extreme primary electorates encourage the election of more extreme legislators, and that more extreme legislators in turn cause primary sorting, which narrows the primary electorate and makes it even more extreme. This is a continuing cycle that was initiated by the fall of the Solid South. Two major obstacles arise in attempting a direct test of this theory. First, it is very difficult to infer causality in such a simultaneous relationship. Second, only aggregate data are available for this long time period, so we cannot connect individual legislators to the preferences of primary electorates in their own districts. What we can test is if the national polarization of primary electorates is correlated with aggregate legislative polarization, and if that relationship varies at the level of region (South versus non-South). We show that the specific pattern of polarization of primary electorates matches this part of the dynamic theory well.
A caveat to our analysis is that it is largely based on self-reported primary election turnout.
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Past work has shown that overreporing of turnout can be consequential for substantive research conclusions (Vavreck, 2007) . We leverage one year from roughly the middle of our time series in which we have both validated and self-reported primary turnout in order to test for relevant biases and we find that our substantive conclusions are unchanged (see Appendix Section A).
Results
In this section, we show that American primary electorates have polarized over the period, moving from electorates quite similar to general electorates early on to distinct groups by the end. We note the contrast of this to general electorates, and then explore the mechanism underlying this polarization, finding that sorting of ideology to party primary appears to be a larger factor than changes in patterns of turnout by ideology.
In Appendix Figure A2 , we present the distribution of estimated ideologies for the full population for each year in which the ANES asks respondents about primary election turnout, a subset of the years presented in Hill and Tausanovitch (2015) . Little evidence exists of polarization of the overall distribution of ideology during this period. While small changes in variance are observed, they are of little substantive importance and not statistically significant. This figure establishes that the distribution of ideology in the public as a whole has not become more polarized over this segment of time.
In contrast to the public as a whole, we find notable polarization by party primary electorates over the same period. The top frame of Figure In the 1950s, the median Democratic primary voter was indistinguishable from the median voter in the public as a whole and, in fact, the credible intervals of Democratic and Republican medians overlap. The posterior median has Republican primary electorates more conservative than the general median even in 1958, but by less than one-quarter of a standard deviation. By 1980, the Democrats were one-quarter of a standard deviation to the left of the median general voter and the Republicans were one-third of a standard deviation to the right. The overall distance grew from 1980 onward. In 2012, the two party primary electorates were notably more distinct, with the median Republican primary voter almost a full standard deviation more conservative than the median general election voter, and the median Democratic primary voter more than half a standard deviation more liberal.
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Why did the median ideology of Democratic and Republican primary electorates diverge over this period? Part of the story is a change in the relationship between ideology and turnout. From 1958 to about 1980, the rate of participation in primary elections was fairlyconstant across the distribution of ideologies. Centrists were no less likely to participate in nominating contests than those in the tails. Beginning in 1988 in our series, the rate of participation in primaries began to increase for individuals in the tails of the distribution relative to those in the center. Figure 3 shows the voter turnout rate in primary elections for each decile of estimated ideology in that year; Note: In the top panel, each point represents the distance from the median voter in that party's primary electorate to the median voter in the general electorate in that year. The bottom panel shows the trend in average DW-NOMINATE score for each party in the U.S. House by congress (from http://www.voteview.com). 14 "1" indicates the 0-10% decile, or the most liberal 10% of the population in that year, and "10"
indicates the 90-100% decile, or the most conservative 10% in that year, with deciles 2 through 9 moving from liberal to conservative. The y-axis is the turnout rate among voters in that decile. We allow the y-axis to vary across years to focus on the within-year variation in turnout; turnout varies across years owing to national factors such as eligibility, secular trends and presidential versus midterm election years.
For most of the sample period, the turnout rate was either unrelated to ideology (a flat distri- 1968, 1972, 1976, or 1980 
Evaluating the importance of each mechanism
To benchmark how much of the polarization of primary electorates from 1958 to 2012 is explained by primary sorting versus changes in rates of primary participation by ideology, we simulate two counterfactual states of primary participation in 2012. First, to measure the effect of sorting only This simulates the effect of sorting alone on change in polarization during this period. 13 Our median estimate is that the distance between the two party primary medians in 2012 with only primary sorting would have been 1.2 units, a bit more than one standard deviation but 42% less polarization than we actually observe in 2012. Nonetheless, this estimate is six times greater than the polarization observed in 1958, suggesting that primary sorting has polarized the ideology of primary electorates to a substantial degree.
The fourth bar represents polarization in 2012 with change in turnout only. That is, this is polarization if 2012 respondents had not sorted into party primaries by ideology more than in 1958, 13 To estimate, we calculate the rate of primary participation by (across-year) ideology decile from 1958, then sample primary voters at random from 2012 respondents given their ideology decile and the 1958 rate of primary participation and assign them to a party primary based on their 2012 party identification. We apply this sampling strategy at each posterior iteration, calculate the party medians, and present the posterior median and credible interval of the distance between medians in the figure, which captures both uncertainty in respondent ideology and sampling variability in simulated turnout. 14 We find that change in turnout is a smaller contributor to the change in polarization than primary sorting, with a posterior median estimate of the distance between the party medians of 0.3 units, one-third of a standard deviation.
Even so, this level of polarization is 1.5 times that of the observed polarization in 1958, suggesting that change in who turns out in primary elections has increased the polarization of primary electorates by 50%.
In sum, our simulations suggest that polarization of primary electorates in 2012 is about six times greater than in 1958 owing to the sorting of primary voters into party primaries by ideology, and about 50% greater owing to changes in who participates in primary elections.
Sorting of primary electorates in the American South
To this point we have analyzed the entire country as a whole. There is reason to believe, however, that the dynamics of primary turnout differed substantially in the South, as we document above (see also, e.g., Key, 1949) . Figure 6 replicates Figure 2 with separate panels for the South and non-South. 15 In order to draw attention to the pattern we wish to highlight, we have superimposed best fit lines for each party in each region for the periods ending in 1980 and starting in 1988.
In 1958, Democratic primary voters in the South were ideologically conservative relative to the median voter in the nationwide general electorate (as indicated by the posterior median and credible interval greater than zero). Estimates are uncertain for the median Republican primary voters because of the very small number of election participants. The credible interval is very wide 14 To estimate, we calculate the rate of participation in each party primary in each (across-year) decile of ideology in 1958, then sample a counterfactual party primary for each 2012 respondent given their ideology decile and the 1958 rate of participation in each primary. We then used observed 2012 primary turnout to describe the primary voters. We sample party primary at each posterior iteration, calculate the party medians, and present the posterior median and credible interval of the distance between medians in the figure.
15 Following the coding in the ANES, the set of states coded as "South" here are Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Washington, D.C., Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia. We choose a broad definition of the South in order to err on the conservative side in our results. If we have included states that rightfully belong in another region, our findings will be weaker as a result. The best fit lines in Figure 6 highlight differences in the trends by region and party. In the non-South, no change in polarization can be discerned between 1958 and 1980. The slope of the lines for both parties is zero to the third decimal place, and precisely estimated. In the South, the ideology of Republican primary voters also was stable before 1980. As we show below, the main change for Southern Republican primaries was in participation, which grew from negligible to with existing research on the party sorting caused by the Southern realignment (Carmines and Stimson, 1980) , as well as the notion that clearer party platforms assisted voters in sorting into the "correct" party (Levendusky, 2010 (Levendusky, , 2009a . Once a Republican primary emerged in the South that was dominated by conservatives, a clear incentive emerged for conservative candidates to run in Republican primaries. As conservative voters and candidates moved from Democratic primaries to Republican primaries in the South, the remaining Democratic coalition was more liberal. As the Democratic and Republican parties became more homogenous, they sent clearer signals to voters in the rest of the country. This sequence of realignment and then primary sorting explains why voters in the non-South, who already were somewhat sorted before the changes in the South, became further sorted and more distinct following the Southern realignment.
In summary, our evidence has revealed two trends in the ideologies of primary electorates that differ by region. These are encapsulated in Table 1 
Conclusion
We have shown that primary electorates have sorted by political party over the last half century and that this sorting mirrors the dramatic changes that have taken place in national politics. The set of people who turn out to vote in Republican primaries are now more conservative than before, and the set of people who turn out to vote in Democratic primaries are more liberal. That change occurred because of (a) an increase in the correspondence between non-centrist views and the likelihood of participating in any primary, and (b) an increase in the correspondence between policy views and attendance of the primary of the party that matches those ideological views. The latter factor appears to be the driving mechanism.
Our contribution brings direct evidence to a longstanding anecdotal claim. We establish new empirical patterns of the polarization of primary voters and regional variation in the incidence of this polarization. These patterns are directly relevant to the literature on primary elections, by policy ideology. Over the second half of the 20th century, voters became more aware of the policy stances of the respective parties, and have demonstrated a slow but consistent tendency to join the party that better matches their policy positions (Levendusky, 2009b) .
C Sorting of primary voters versus partisanship
In Figure A3 , we compare party sorting among primary voters (as in Figure 6 above) to sorting among partisan identifiers (including leaners) regardless of turnout, by region. In general, the two groups show similar levels of sorting, with primary voters more conservative in both parties historically, but with primary voters becoming more extreme than identifiers in the latest two elections. These differences are small, but the general conclusion is that primary voters are sorting to a greater extent, relative to their 1958 disposition, than party identifiers, in both regions. Particularly in the South relative to 1958 alignment, primary medians have moved more than identifier medians. The fact that primary sorting is even greater than party sorting suggests that party sorting occurred to a greater degree among primary voters. Previous work has not shown that party sorting affected the composition of primaries, or that primary sorting differed by region. Note: Each point is the rate of primary turnout among that decile of ideology (1=most liberal 10%, 10=most conservative 10% in that year) in 1980, with location on the x-axis self-reported and location on the y-axis validated. Limited to cases matched to voter files. 
